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The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society: 
National and Global Influences on Transnational Association 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent decades have seen an explosion of transnational networking and activism, but 
participation varies widely around the globe.  Using negative binomial regression, we explore 
how national and global political and economic factors shape this “uneven geography” of 
participation in transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs).  Contrary to assumptions 
in popular discourse, we find a continued importance of the state and limited importance of 
global economic integration in determining participation in transnational associations.  But while 
ties to the global economy do not significantly impact participation, a country’s links to global 
institutions enhance opportunities for transnational activism.  Rich countries’ citizens are more 
active transnationally, but low-income countries with strong ties to the global polity are also 
more tied to global activist networks.  This suggests that TSMOs do not simply reproduce world-
system stratification, but –aided by a supportive institutional environment-- they help sow the 
seeds for its transformation. 
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 Globalization, or the expansion of all types of social interactions across national 
boundaries, has led governments to turn increasingly to global institutions like the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the United Nations to resolve transnational problems.  As this happens, 
social movement actors seeking to change local and national practices find that they must look 
beyond their national boundaries to do so.  The global political context both expands and 
complicates the strategic choices available to those advocating political and social change.  
Activists increasingly need information and expertise relevant to transnational political arenas in 
order to pursue their social change goals. Therefore, it is not surprising that the growth of 
international agreements and organizations among governments has been accompanied by a 
corresponding proliferation of transnational civil society associations of all types. 
The dramatic growth in cross-border interactions among non-state actors has led scholars 
of transnational relations to call for an expansion of our traditional, state-bounded notions of 
civil society to account for a transnational public sphere (see Guidry et al. 2000).  Many speak of 
a “global civil society” (see, e.g., Wapner 1996; Clark et al. 1998; Anheier et al. 2001; 
Warkentin and Mingst 2000), which we, along with Paul Wapner, define as "that dimension of 
transnational collective life in which citizens organize themselves -- outside their identity with a 
particular state or their role as a producer or consumer-- to advance shared agendas and 
coordinate political activities throughout the world” (2002:204).  But there are strong reasons to 
be skeptical that this “global civil society” is “global” in the sense that it is broadly 
representative of and accessible to all the world’s citizens.  Some analysts (e.g., Tarrow 2001a; 
Rootes 2002) question the very presence of a global civil society by pointing to the limits of its 
global-ness and the weakness of the actual transnational interactions it incorporates. They 
emphasize that national level processes and ideologies still dominate much of the discourse and 
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strategic thinking of activists, who continue to organize around nationally defined aims (e.g., 
Imig and Tarrow 2001).   
Global Politics and Civil Society.  Globalization’s effect on social movement 
mobilization can be seen as parallel to the transformation of contentious politics during the rise 
of national states (cf. Tilly 1984; Markoff 2003).  In a global institutional setting, movement 
efforts to shape the practices of a particular government require international legal or scientific 
expertise, understandings of the rivalries and practices of inter-state political bargaining, and/or 
capacities for mobilizing protests and otherwise bringing simultaneous pressure against multiple 
national governments.1  Activists thus need organizations that can facilitate cross-cultural 
communication and manage diversity in order to articulate and advance a shared agenda.2  It 
should not be surprising, therefore, to find that social movement organizations devoted especially 
to transnational level organizing and political action play key roles in global level contentious 
politics.   
Data from the Yearbook of International Associations show that the numbers of active 
transnationally organized citizens’ groups (INGOs)3 grew from less than one thousand in the 
1950s to nearly 20,000 in 1999 (Union of International Associations 2004). Within this 
population of transnational voluntary associations, we find a subset of groups that are explicitly 
founded to promote some social or political change.  Because such groups are more likely to be 
involved in processes surrounding social change, we focus our analysis on this smaller set of 
INGOs, which we call transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs).4  The population 
of TSMOs has also expanded at a tremendous rate over recent decades from fewer than 100 
organizations in the 1950s to more than 1000 today.  At the same time, we see some expansion in 
the global reach of these organizations as more groups are based in the global South5 and as the 
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sector expands to include other groups in society. 
 However, a closer look reveals that participation in both INGOs and TSMOs varies 
dramatically across countries, and this is particularly true of countries outside the traditional core 
of the global economy.  Data from the 2000 edition of the Yearbook indicate that core countries 
of the world system remain the most integrated, while later-industrializing regions are far less 
active in the international non-governmental and transnational social movement sectors. With 
regard to the broader population of INGOs, citizens in countries of the global North participate in 
an average of 2,600 organizations compared to an average of 613 for citizens in the global South. 
Moreover, there is far less variation in INGO participation across core countries than there is in 
peripheral and semi-peripheral countries.6  While the difference between core and non-core 
countries for TSMO participation is not as dramatic, citizens in core countries participate on 
average in nearly three times as many TSMOs as citizens in non-core countries. The average 
core country has members in 408 TSMOs, while the average outside the core is just 138 
organizations.   
Citizens of France are most active in these groups, with 553 TSMOs and 3,551 INGOs 
reporting members in that country.  At the other end of the scale of INGO participation are 
Afghanistan, North Korea and Oman, with an average of just 159 INGOs reporting members in 
those countries. Turkmenistan has the lowest involvement in TSMOs, with 15 organizations 
listing its citizens among their members.  Of the twenty-five countries with the most active 
participation in INGOs and TSMOs, nineteen are among the traditional core states.  But also 
included here are Brazil, India, Argentina, Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland.   
Western Europeans are active in more than 80% of all TSMOs, and citizens of the U.S. 
and Canada participate in nearly 70% of all TSMOs.  On the other hand, much of the developing 
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world is less integrated into the transnational social movement sector, even if their participation 
has grown during the 1980s and 90s.  People from Africa and Asia are active in only about 60% 
of all groups, the former Soviet region is active in about half of all TSMOs, while Middle 
Eastern countries participate in about 40% of TSMOs.  This paper seeks to identify the factors 
that help explain these differing rates of transnational participation.  
 
Factors Driving Participation in TSMOs 
Building transnational alliances is not an easy process.  Even where transnational social 
movement actors consciously work to incorporate more diverse peoples and issues, actually 
doing so can require exceptional costs and risks, and localized organizing is clearly cheaper and 
easier in many ways (Liebowitz 2000; Tarrow 2001a; 2001b; Smith 2000).  But the observed 
growth in transnational association suggests that various forces are working to both reduce the 
costs and risks of transnational organizing and to increase demand for it.  We would thus expect 
that the distribution of participation in global civil society is not random, but rather it is shaped 
by these social, political, and economic factors that affect the costs and benefits of transnational 
association. Both state- and global-level factors shape the character and scope of transnational 
alliances.  Global political and economic dynamics lead some regions and nations to be more or 
less oriented towards a global polity, and state level political processes allow variable levels of 
political participation by citizens (see, e.g., Kitchelt 1986; Koopmans 1999; Jenkins and Schock 
1992; Joppke 1992; della Porta and Kriesi 1999).  Below we outline the major theoretical 
orientations that guide our attempt to explain participation in global civil society.  
 
National Opportunities and Resources.   
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A major theme in theories of globalization is that the rise of supranational institutions and 
transnational problems is reducing the power and autonomy of the state.  Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the state remains crucial to both defining major political opportunities for challengers and 
shaping the forms and character of political association: 
 
[S]tates remain dominant in most areas of policy -- for example in maintaining domestic 
security-- even if they have become weaker in their ability to control capital flows. . . . 
[C]itizens . . . still live in states and, in democratic ones at least, they have the 
opportunities, the networks, and the well-known repertoires of national politics.  Those 
are incentives to operate on native ground that the hypothetical attractions of 'global civil 
society' cannot easily match.  (Tarrow 2001a: 2-3) 
 
However, it is also important to remember that states vary tremendously in the extent to which 
they are able to affect conditions within or outside their borders.  The governments of the United 
States and France might be considered fairly autonomous and consequential domestic and 
international actors, while Bolivia and Somalia are much more limited in their abilities to affect 
global policy decisions or even to determine their own domestic policies.  Similarly, citizens in 
global North countries tend to enjoy greater access to the resources and skills needed for global 
activism than do their Southern counterparts, and more importantly they also have greater 
political access to states with the largest influence over global policies (see, e.g., Bob, 2001; 
Forthcoming). Despite such differences, many analyses of political mobilization tend to treat the 
state as a comparable unit of analysis.7  We will explore this assumption further in our analysis, 
which asks whether or not the factors shaping participation in TSMOs vary among different 
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countries.  Below we discuss how national contexts shape the possibilities for political 
participation and alter the costs and benefits of such participation.   
 Political Openness & Repression. Studies of national political opportunity emphasize 
the role of the national state in determining opportunities for citizens to engage in political 
discourse and action.  Because participation in transnational social movements is one measure of 
an available infrastructure for coordinated protest activity, factors associated with the emergence 
of domestic protest are useful for our analysis. Among the domestic factors at work are the 
availability of resources for association, legislative and judicial systems that protect individual 
rights to free association and public speech, electoral rules that govern possibilities for political 
competition, alliances and conflicts among elites, and capacities for state action, including 
repression (see, e.g., Tarrow 1988).   
 In her analysis of transnational conservation mobilization, Lewis (2002) found that the 
states that were most likely to be selected for transnational conservation projects were those that 
were both politically open and that had strong NGO sectors.  She suggests that this pattern might 
be different from that found in the human rights issue-area, where there is evidence that the least 
open and most repressive societies would attract more transnational human rights activism (e.g., 
those trying to engage what Keck and Sikkink call the “boomerang effect” (1998)).  Political 
regimes that discourage popular engagement in politics are not likely to be associated with high 
levels of civic engagement.  On the other hand, we would expect that politically open states with 
vigorous and active civil societies would be the most involved in transnational SMOs.8   
 Patricia Chilton tested this assumption that strong national civil societies would be 
required for effective transnational cooperation.  She found, however, that while this was true for 
some cases, in East Germany and Czechoslovakia where national civil societies were 
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comparatively weak, there were strong connections to transnational coalitions (Chilton 
1995:206). A capacity to form transnational coalitions in these cases was not dependent upon 
previous levels of (national) civil society development, and it was the ability to engage in 
transnational coalitions that led to the transformations of these societies (Chilton 1995). 
Commonalities of language, symbolic references, and the larger political context that affected all 
countries of eastern and western Europe served to condition the possibility of transnational 
coalition building despite the absence of liberal societal institutions in some of the countries. 
This finding leads to the question we investigate later of how supranational conditions might 
facilitate transnationalism between less geographically and/or culturally proximate peoples in 
cases where there are few domestic opportunities for organizing political challenges. 
 State repression also affects participation in transnational associations, but in some cases 
it can serve to counter the intentions of repressive states.  High levels of repression may either 
stifle citizen participation in associations, or it might encourage the formation of ties to 
transnational associations that can serve as a source of protection against government repression 
(see, e.g., Sikkink 1993; Coy 1997).  Also, countries with longer histories of democratic 
governance should have more of the human capital necessary for active civil societies both 
nationally and transnationally.  For instance, in his study of the formation of human rights 
associations, Patrick Ball found that countries with longer democratic traditions were more 
fruitful sites for organizing (Ball 2000).  In short, state policies that affect the costs of 
participation in politics and public associations should have strong influences on the levels of 
participation in transnational SMOs.   
 Resources.  Economic and social resources are also crucial to the emergence and strength 
of social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McCarthy 1996; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 
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1996).  We would expect, therefore, that participation in transnational SMOs will vary with the 
availability of resources for mobilization across countries.  Thus, we expect that countries with a 
relatively large and educated middle class would have greater participation rates in transnational 
social movement organizations than poorer countries. Levels of economic development will also 
have a strong influence on citizens’ access to important communications infrastructures that 
assist participation in global civil society groups.  
 Participation in transnational associations is also likely to be determined by the character 
of the national voluntary sector (see, e.g., Schofer and Fourcade-Gournchas 2001; Curtis et al. 
2001).  Associational networks, or mobilizing structures, provide the foundation for movement 
organizing, cultivating spaces for information sharing, building solidarity, and cultivating shared 
identities. Where there are opportunities for citizens to freely engage in a variety of voluntary 
associations, there is a greater propensity towards involvement in diverse social movement 
organizations (Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Minkoff 1997).9 
   This consideration of how national contexts shape the opportunities for citizens to 
participate in transnational political associations generates the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Participation in global civil society (as indicated by TSMO memberships) will be 
higher in countries with stronger democracies. 
H2: Participation in TSMOs will be higher in countries with comparatively higher levels 
of economic development. 
 
While it is important to distinguish national level factors from transnational ones, we emphasize 
that these ostensibly national conditions are often strongly influenced by global processes, 
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particularly in the global South.  World system and dependency theories postulate that internal 
grievances, as well as the availability of resources to address them, are affected by a country’s 
position in the world system, among other factors. Thus, a country’s position in the world 
economic hierarchy is likely to have an important influence on people’s decisions about whether 
to participate in transnational collective action to attempt to change their conditions.  It is to the 
system of international economic relations that we now turn our attention.  
 
Structural Relationship to the World System 
 The relationship of a state to the capitalist world economy has been identified as an 
important causal factor in the emergence and spread of rebellion (see Jenkins and Schock 1992). 
It shapes both the opportunities for domestic challengers to organize and engage in collective 
action against the state, and it constrains the state’s capacity to respond to popular challenges 
(Maney 2002; Muñoz 2002).  Two key arguments have been forwarded to explain this 
relationship. First, the practices of expanding states and empires, such as the imposition of 
private property and coerced labor, have been linked to protest and rebellion of various kinds. 
Second, colonialism and dependency have contributed to conditions such as widening inequality, 
slowed economic growth, and urbanization.  These factors increase the mobilization potential of 
lower classes while dividing elites, increasing dependency on foreign capital, and weakening the 
legitimacy of the state (Jenkins and Schock 1992; Walton and Seddon 1994).  
 At the same time, the demand of the capitalist world economy for cheap labor from the 
global South contributes to the political exclusion and repression of lower and working classes in 
those states.  Thus, for instance, Mitchell and McCormick (1989) found that periphery countries 
with higher levels of trade with advanced capitalist countries were more likely to imprison and 
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torture their citizens than were those with fewer economic ties.  In a globalized economy, states 
outside the core (and increasingly within the core) compete for foreign investment by reducing 
protections for workers.  The repressive and exclusive character of many global South states can 
be traced back to their colonial origins.  As a consequence of their late integration into the 
system of national states, the manipulation of borders and inter-group tensions by colonial 
powers, and the Cold War politics of military aid, states in the global South tend to be highly 
repressive and to have much greater capacities for – mostly coercive-- collective action than do 
other societal actors within their national borders (Tilly 1990:chapter 7).  In contrast, core state 
governments have more resources with which to respond to the demands of citizens, and they 
tend to be more democratic than non-core states.  This analysis suggests that, rather than serving 
as tools for economic development, key mechanisms of global economic integration -- foreign 
investment, trade, and loans – will lead to the continued exploitation of many states and their 
weakest members (Timberlake and Williams 1984; Hippler 1995).   
 Further limiting opportunities for political mobilization in the global South is the fact that 
core states intervene directly in the domestic political processes of Southern states in order to 
support regimes that are favorable to their economic interests.  Ironically, such activity is often 
legitimated by a claim that it is helping to support democratic development in a subject country.  
William Robinson (1996) refers to this intervention as the promotion of “low intensity 
democracy” or “polyarchy,” where electoral competition and governance is restricted, through a 
variety of interventions, to those alternatives that do not threaten the economic interests of the 
core.  This generally means, for instance, that politicians must agree to open their nation’s 
markets to foreign goods and investments, privatize state industries, and to continue making 
payments on international debts. 
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 Not only do global South countries tend to have fewer domestic political opportunities 
for social movements, but also their domestic contexts are more strongly determined by global-
level processes than are those of core countries.10  In other words, it is much harder for activists 
in the global South to ignore global processes and institutions than it might be for activists in the 
core.  At the same time, the world system hierarchy makes both elite and social movement actors 
in the global South far less able to affect both the domestic as well as the global decisions that 
shape their environments than do their counterparts in the core (or the “global North”).11  This 
may be expected to increase the demand for transnational ties in the global South.  And although 
weak and threatened states may repress political organizations that target domestic actors, they 
may be more tolerant of groups that are critical of the global financial institutions and foreign 
capital.12   
 Neoliberal-oriented policy makers and popular discourse (in the global North, at least) 
either explicitly or implicitly claim that a country’s integration into the global economy will 
produce economic growth that, in turn, will generate other social benefits, such as improved 
quality of life, environmental preservation, and political openness.  We refer to this as the 
“trickle down” theory of globalization.  If this theory is accurate, we would expect that higher 
levels of trade and foreign investment in a country would be associated with more dense 
transnational associational ties.  Thus, we would expect to find a positive relationship between 
global economic integration and other forms of global interactions, including participation in 
civil society associations.  Sassen’s work (1998) provides a more elaborated understanding of 
how global economic ties might affect transnational mobilization, and her work leads us to 
expect that flows of trade and direct foreign investment will positively affect levels of 
participation in TSMOs, but not as a result of the trickle down of supposed benefits of economic 
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growth.  Instead, these economic relations serve as mechanisms that foster transnational social 
ties, flows of technology, and communications infrastructures.  The following hypotheses 
emerge from the preceding discussion of the world economic system: 
H3: Participation in TSMOs will be highest in the richer, core countries of the world 
economy. 
H4: Participation in TSMOs will be highest in countries that are most integrated into the 
global economy, i.e., those with comparatively higher levels of global trade and 
investment. 
H5: Countries that are integrated into the global economy in a highly dependent manner 
(i.e., the poorest countries) will have higher rates of participation in TSMOs.  
 
We drew from neoliberal and institutional arguments to articulate these hypotheses, but we note 
that world systems theorists would argue that the global economy affects countries differently, 
depending upon their position in the world-system hierarchy.  So while economic integration 
may benefit core countries and their citizens, it has detrimental effects on the countries and 
people outside the core.  Thus, our analysis will investigate how world-system position interacts 
with measures of economic integration to affect TSMO participation. 
   
Levels of Integration into the Global Political System 
 Despite the emphases in popular discourse on economic forms of globalization, 
integration of states into a global society also takes on political and social forms.  Although the 
international political arena has not replaced the nation-state as a mobilizing context for social 
movements, it has become increasingly important by expanding the available political space for 
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building alliances and providing a common focal point for contention. Transnational social 
movements play an important role not only in the continuing construction of the international 
political arena but also in the enforcement of internationally-generated policies and treaties 
adopted by states (Smith 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998).  But the extent to which political actors 
will choose to bring a particular grievance to transnational political arenas is also shaped by that 
country’s involvement in the global political order.  As Risse-Kappen argues:  
 
The more the respective issue-area is regulated by international norms of cooperation, the 
more permeable should state boundaries become for transnational activities.  Highly 
regulated and cooperative structures of international governance tend to legitimize 
transnational activities and to increase their access to the national polities as well as their 
ability to form ‘winning coalitions’ for policy change.  Transnational relations acting in a 
highly institutionalized international environment are, therefore, likely to overcome 
hurdles otherwise posed by state-dominated domestic structures more easily. (1995: 6-7) 
 
While national structures continue to present certain obstacles for mobilization, the existence of 
international norms and the growing authority of supranational structures increase non-
governmental actors’ potential for influencing national policy (Risse-Kappen 1995).  In the 
absence of resources and formal mechanisms for enforcing most international treaties, social 
movement organizations have played an important role in monitoring international agreements.  
Thus, participation in the transnational social movement sector is more likely in states that have 
ratified international treaties.  Other factors also affect a state’s incorporation into a global 
political order. For instance, Reimann (2002) shows that when a country hosts or otherwise 
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participates in international conferences, their national elites become socialized in international 
norms that accept non-governmental organizations as legitimate participants in global 
conferences, and they begin to at least pay lip service to the idea that civil society deserves a 
voice in national and international policy debates.13  This creates opportunities for that country’s 
social movement sector to expand their domestic mobilization as well as their access to national 
and international political processes.   
 Participation in international treaties also signals a state’s incorporation into what Boli 
and his colleagues call the “world polity” (Boli and Thomas 1997; 1999; Boli, Loya and Loftin 
1999; Meyer et al. 1997a; 1997b).  A state’s participation in international organizations serves as 
evidence of its adoption of a wider system of values, beliefs, and organizing principles (see, e.g., 
Frank et al. 2000; Frank 1999).  These “world cultural values,” moreover, reflect the principal 
tenets of Western ideologies that support individualism, legal- scientific rationalism, and 
economic liberalism.  According to the world cultural perspective, as states become increasingly 
enmeshed in the world polity (e.g., through participation in international organizations and 
agreements of all kinds), they begin to internalize world cultural values and to mimic the 
organizational routines of other actors in their environments.  This facilitates transnational 
association among people from different nations who, as a result of their countries’ involvement 
in the world polity, face very similar structures of opportunity and grievance as well as common 
cultural tools for interpreting and responding to problems (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Giugni 
2002).   
 Another institutional dynamic that scholars of global institutions have identified is what 
we might call the “hypocrisy paradox.”  This refers to the institutional dynamics that encourage 
weak states to join international treaties in order to enhance their international legitimacy, even 
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though they have no intention of following such agreements.  Notions of what an effective state 
is come from observations of what other states do, and participating in inter-state negotiations 
and signing treaties is an essential aspect of state action.  Moreover, once accepted into the 
community of states, a country can sign treaties in order to both attempt to influence the course 
of negotiations and to draw upon the symbolic and concrete resources of international 
institutions, which can enhance their capacities to perform the basic functions of a state (Boli 
1999).  They might even compete with each other for favorable international standing and 
whatever material benefits may come from that.  Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2003) tested this 
assumption, and they found a negative association between the ratification of international 
human rights treaties and actual human rights practices.  However, they also found that, although 
in the short term human rights practices did not correspond to treaty requirements, over time 
human rights practices improved.  They associate these improvements with the fact that treaty 
participation assisted the emergence of civil society groups that advanced human rights claims 
against the state through international human rights machinery.14  This interpretation is supported 
by the work of Patrick Ball, who analyzed the factors associated with the formation of human 
rights organizations in Latin America.  He explains the association he found between treaty 
participation and rates of organizational founding in these terms: 
 
Activists exploited the weakness of the hypocritical position required by the international 
public sphere in order to strengthen claims for justice.  In this use of hypocrisy lies an 
insight: although noble international agreements made by brutal state leaders may seem 
cynical or meaningless, in the context of a globalizing regime of international human 
rights, activists have learned how to hold states accountable for these promises. (2000: 
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74) 
 
 Below are several hypotheses that emerge from a consideration of world polity dynamics 
and their likely impacts on the sector: 
 
H6: Participation in TSMOs will be highest in countries that have longer and more 
extensive involvement in international organizations.   
H7: Participation in TSMOs will be highest in countries that are most integrated into the 
world political order, as represented by international treaty ratifications.  
 
Data and Methods 
 The dependent variable for this study is a count of the number of TSMOs that report 
having members in a given country. We identified the population of transnational social 
movement organizations from the Yearbook of International Associations, the most 
comprehensive, annual census of international associations.  The Yearbook is edited by the 
Union of International Associations (UIA), which was formally charged by the United Nations 
with the task of assembling a regular database of all international and transnational 
organizations.  Coders reviewed all entries in the Yearbook to identify those international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) that were explicitly formed to promote some social or 
political change goal (broadly defined).15  The majority of social movement organizations in our 
dataset were organized around the issues of human rights, women’s rights, environmental 
protection, peace, economic justice, or some combination of these issues.16  For each 
organization, we collected information about their headquarters location, issue focus, founding 
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year, structure, membership type, change strategies, ties with other organizations, and countries 
of membership.  A matrix containing all of the organizations and countries was created in 
STATA. Values of 1 and 0 were used to indicate whether or not an organization had members in 
a given country. Next, the data were aggregated to attain the total number of organizations active 
in each of the countries. This aggregate number of organizations per country is our measure of 
the extent to which a given country’s citizens participate in TSMOs.   
 Our control variables measure the influence of domestic factors on levels of participation 
in transnational associations.  Total population, domestic resources, and level of democracy are 
included in the analysis. Data for population were collected from the World Bank and is a count 
of all residents of a country regardless of legal status or citizenship. Countries with less than one 
million people are excluded from analysis because data were missing on other important 
variables for more than 30% of countries in this group. To measure the levels of domestic 
resources available within a society, we divided the countries into three economic groupings: 
low-income, middle-income, and high-income.  Our categories are based upon the World Bank’s 
economic classification, which ranks countries according to their gross national income per 
capita.17  Importantly, the income measure indicates the relevance of world-system position for 
transnational participation, with the low-income classification corresponding most closely with 
the group of countries that would be considered peripheral with regard to access and influence 
within the world economic system.  Finally, we incorporate a measure of the extent to which a 
country’s political system creates opportunities for public associations and political participation 
of any kind, expecting that more democratic societies would provide greater opportunities for 
mobilization.  We use data from the Jaggers and Gurr Polity III data set to measure the extent of 
regime openness. 
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 The extent to which a country’s level and type of integration into the global economy 
influences citizen participation in TSMOs is measured by a selection of variables including trade, 
foreign direct investment, official development assistance flows, and external debt.  Data for 
trade and FDI were collected from the World Bank. The CIA’s World Fact Book was our source 
for data on amount of external debt. Finally, ODA flows are measured with data from both the 
World Bank and the OECD. Because this variable aims to capture the economic ties among both 
donor and recipient countries, and because we include other measures to indicate differences 
between rich and poor countries, we use absolute values of both incoming and outgoing flows of 
ODA as a percentage of GNP.  Detailed descriptions of each of our economic measures appear in 
Appendix 1. 
 To measure the breadth of a country’s integration into global political institutions, we 
recorded participation in all intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), years of membership in the 
United Nations, and the number of major human rights treaties to which the country is a party.  
Data for IGO participation were collected from the Yearbook of International Associations as 
counts of the numbers of intergovernmental organizations in which a country participates.  The 
number of years each country has been a member of the UN is calculated as of 1995.18  Data for 
the number of major human rights treaties ratified were collected from Multilateral Treaties on 
Deposit with the UN Secretary General.19   Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the key 
measures used in this study.20   
 All of our global economic measures, along with population and IGO memberships, were 
logged in order to reduce the effects of extreme observations. We chose to tighten the 
distributions rather than drop outliers because these represent real data points. Because 
population, trade and debt have extreme ranges and are skewed to the right, we chose a base 10 
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transformation (see, e.g., Cleveland 1984). Although FDI and ODA have less extreme 
distributions, they are positively skewed and we used the log 10 transformation on these  
variables as well.21 Moreover, debt and ODA have raw values that are less than 1. Because the 
logarithm for such values is undefined, we increased the minimum value of the two distributions 
by adding 1 to all values before transforming them.  
   
Table 1 about here. 
 
 We expect our economic and political measures to have a delayed effect on participation 
in transnational civil society. However, we expect the effects of political factors on participation 
in transnational civil society to be more temporally proximate than the effects of the economic 
factors. This is the case because the causal relationship between domestic or global political 
factors and participation in transnational civil society is often bi-directional. That is, a 
government’s participation in international forums is often a response to either direct or indirect 
pressure from civil society groups, and once a government signs a treaty, it must provide regular 
reports on its progress, thereby encouraging attention from civil society advocates.22  Therefore, 
we allow less lag time between political integration and TSMO participation than we do between 
global economic integration and TSMO participation. We use 1990 as the baseline year for our 
economic measures.  For countries of the former Soviet Union, 1990 data were not generally 
available, and in those instances, we used the closest available year to 1990.  Also, ODA was 
collected for 1991 because 1990 data were unavailable for more than 30% of the countries for 
which we have TSMO data. To test whether one or two years’ difference affected model 
outcomes, ODA data for 1992 and remaining economic measures for 1994 were substituted in 
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the models. The substituted values did not yield statistically different results from those in our 
reported models. Political measures were collected for 1995, except for our measure of 
democracy, which was collected for the final year that Jaggers and Gurr compiled world 
democracy measures--1994. 
 Interaction terms were created using the mean-centered, main effect variables. Mean-
centering corrects for multicollinearity and is a widely accepted technique (see, e.g., Jaccard and 
Turrisi 2003). We assessed eigen values and the means of variance inflation factors (see, e.g. 
Neter et al. 1996) and determined that our models were not weakened by multicollinearity.  
 
Analysis of count data 
 Our dependent variable is a discrete count of organizational memberships. Because count 
data do not follow a normal distribution, we tested our proposed models to determine if they 
violated any of the assumptions of OLS regression. We first fit a model containing all of our 
predictor variables. We then executed a Cook-Weisberg test (Goldstein 1992a) for 
heteroskedasticty using the fitted values for the logged count of TSMO memberships. We tested 
the null hypothesis that our model exhibits constant variance against the alternative that it does 
not. The results of the test led us to reject the null hypothesis (chi2=8.30; p <= .01) and conclude 
that our model violates the assumption of homoskedasticity. We then performed a Ramsey test 
(Goldstein 1992b) using powers of the fitted values of the logged dependent variable to test 
whether unmeasured variance was evident. We tested the null hypothesis that our model has no 
omitted variance against the alternative that it does. The test led us to reject the null hypothesis 
(chi2=2.86; p <= .05) and conclude that our model contains unmeasured variance. In sum, even 
when our dependent variable is log-transformed, our models violate the assumptions of OLS 
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regression. Therefore, a model that relaxes these assumptions and includes a parameter that 
accounts for the unmeasured variance is required. 
 In the following analyses, we use a generalized version of the Poisson model -- negative 
binomial regression estimated by maximum likelihood (see, e.g. Hammond and Holly1998; 
Agresti 1996). By relaxing the assumptions that underlie the Poisson model, negative binomial 
regression allows for excess variability (overdispersion) among event counts (King 1989).  Our 
models take on the following negative binomial form: 
 
 
   
An overdispersion parameter, σ2, is included in our models. The value of the parameter 
represents the factor by which the variance of λi exceeds its expectation. When σ2 approaches 1, 
the negative binomial model is the same as Poisson. A significant overdispersion parameter 
translates into a rejection of the null hypothesis that λi=1. 
 
Results 
 Table 2 reports estimates of the effects of our control variables and measures of global 
economic and political integration on rates of TSMO participation. Control variables are 
significant across models. Population and democracy are positively and significantly associated 
with TSMO participation, while middle- and low-income countries have significantly lower rates 
of participation in transnational organizations than do high income countries.  These findings 
support Tarrow’s (2001) argument that factors internal to states condition participation in 
transnational society and, (not surprisingly) they point to the importance of economic and human 
P(yi │ α, λi) =          Γ(α) Γ(yi + 1) 
 
_Γ(α + λi)_         α _  
 λi + α 
( ) α 
    __λi _ 
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resources for movement mobilization.      
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 Model 2 includes estimates for our measures of global economic integration. Contrary to 
the assumptions of the “trickle down” model of globalization, neither of the positive economic 
integration measures of trade and foreign investment has a significant effect on rates of TSMO 
participation.23 These findings suggest that flows of trade and direct foreign investment do not 
serve directly as catalysts for other types of transnational interactions.  A second measure of the 
extensiveness of ties to the global economy, official aid flows, bears a positive, significant 
relationship with transnational association counts.24 We note that the bivariate negative 
relationship between ODA and TSMO participation (r = -.372) is reversed in the regression 
context. Because the bivariate relationship between income level and both ODA and TSMO 
participation is negative, we interpret the sign reversal in the model as evidence of a suppressor 
effect. That is, the relationship between ODA and TSMO participation is suppressed by the 
relationship between income level and TSMO participation. The coefficient indicating the 
strength and direction of the bivariate relationship between ODA and TSMO participation is 
overly influenced by the very high TSMO participation rates of high-income countries.  GNP per 
capita is positively associated with participation (.68) but is negatively associated with ODA 
flows (-.52). When we control for income, the sign reverses: as ODA flows increase so too does 
TSMO participation. We explain the positive effect of aid as growing from the tendency of 
transnational aid flows to generate multiple forms of transnational interaction – including ties 
among non-governmental organizations25 – that encourage a proliferation of transnational ties 
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(cf. Sassen 1998).   
 The coefficients of Model 2 suggest that rates of TSMO participation increase by almost 
14% for every 25% increase in ODA.26 The net improvement of model fit for the model 
containing economic measures over the model with control variables only is small but significant 
(G2=15.22 for the difference between –799.25 and –791.64, p <= .01).   
 Before we assess the relationship between political integration measures and rates of 
TSMO participation, we test the World System theorists’ claim that global dynamics will affect 
highly dependent states differently.  As we discussed above, low income countries with high 
levels of debt and aid are integrated into the global economy in ways that should differ from 
those without such dependence on international finance.  Moreover, there is empirical evidence 
to suggest that higher levels of global trade are often not favorable to democratic practices, 
including transnational associational participation (e.g., Mitchell and McCormick 1989; Tilly 
1995).  To test our hypothesis that countries integrated into the global economy in a highly 
dependent manner would have comparatively higher rates of participation than others, we 
created an interaction term that compares rates of participation among low-income countries with 
varying levels of external debt and trade. Model 3 contains the results of this analysis. The 
coefficient for the interaction between low income and trade is both positive and significant, 
while the coefficient for the constituent effect of trade, while not statistically significant, is 
negative. The significance of the interaction term for low income countries and trade suggests 
that the trade effect is significantly larger for low income countries than for other countries. In 
other words, for the poorest countries, ties to global trade networks improve their chances of 
participation in TSMOs, while the same does not hold for other countries. The coefficient 
implies that rates of participation in TSMOs among low income countries increase by 21% for 
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every 25% increase in trade.27 The interaction term for debt and low income countries is not 
significant, suggesting that the effect of debt on TSMO participation is not significantly different 
for low income countries than for other countries.  
 It is also interesting to note that although neither of the coefficients is significant, the 
constituent effect of debt is negative while the interaction between low income and debt is 
positive, a pattern also revealed in other models we tested.  This pattern might be explained by 
the fact that the World Bank and IMF connect the interests of Northern taxpayers with Southern 
interests.  Moreover, these institutions have expanded their connections with civil society groups 
in borrowing countries in response to its critics (Nelson 1996; Fox and Brown 1998), thus 
serving as a potential broker among civil society actors both within and outside the country.  So 
while highly dependent countries are likely to be poorer, they may have more opportunities for 
cultivating transnational alliances than do those without extensive international financial 
assistance.  The international campaign to abolish third world debt, spearheaded by a TSMO 
called Jubilee 2000, reflects this kind of alliance.  We stress that the relationship is not 
significant, but that it does warrant further investigation.   
 Model 4 introduces our measures of global political integration along with our control 
variables.  IGO participation and the number of human rights treaties ratified are significant and 
are positively associated with TSMO participation, irrespective of levels of domestic resources 
and internal political opportunities.  Increasing IGO participation by 25% amounts to a 53% 
increase in TSMO participation. When the number of human rights treaties ratified increases 
from 0 to 5 (the average), rates of TSMO participation go up by  47%.  This offers strong support 
for the world culture argument that a country’s integration into a global polity influences 
domestic norms and institutions in ways that should expand individuals’ participation in civic 
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life.28  Our method provides support for a causal argument that more extensive involvement in 
global institutions produces higher levels of TSMO participation.  Moreover, the results of our 
regression of TSMO participation on the lagged global political integration measures suggest that 
governmental involvement in the world polity provides a realm of opportunity above and beyond 
state-bounded opportunities for participation in TSMOs.  Our theory leads us to expect that civil 
society pressures can and do influence government decisions to join international treaties and 
organizations, but once they join, institutional pressures will reproduce norms and practices that 
encourage further popular mobilization (see, e.g., Frank 1999; 2000; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 
2003). The fit of our model to the data is much improved by including measures of global 
political integration (G2=95.42 for the difference between –799.25 and –751.54, p <= .001). 
 In model 5, we test for differences in the effects of global political factors between low-
income and other countries. The negative (though non-significant) coefficient for the effects of 
the ratification of human rights treaties among low-income countries is consistent with the 
expectations of the “hypocrisy” thesis.  Countries often ratify treaties with few intentions of 
enforcing them, and low-income countries may be particularly likely to do so, given that this is a 
relatively low cost way of attaining status and legitimacy in the inter-state system and that poor 
countries are more vulnerable to international pressures.  But Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui’s 
research (2003) suggests that this negative relationship between treaty participation and human 
rights practice is temporary.  Over time, they argue, the practices of states will gradually conform 
to the norms of world culture.  Our finding that TSMO participation among the more politically 
vulnerable low-income countries also increases when those governments are involved in a 
greater number of IGOs supports their notion of a “hypocrisy paradox” (see also Ball 2000).  The 
significance of the interaction term for low income countries and IGO participation reveals that 
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the effect of IGO participation is significantly greater for low income countries than for other 
countries when we control for domestic factors and other measures of integration in a global 
polity. 
 In model 6 we combine all measures of global economic and political integration.  When 
we control for levels of global political integration, the main effect of trade bears a positive and 
marginally significant relationship with TSMO participation. Two of our measures of global 
political integration sustain positive and significant relationships with TSMO participation, 
irrespective of levels of global economic integration and domestic factors. ODA is not significant 
in this model.  The likelihood ratio test statistic reveals that inclusion of global economic 
measures in the model with global political integration measures and control variables provides 
no significant improvement of fit over the model with global political integration and domestic 
measures only (G2 = 4.04 for the difference between –751.54 and –749.52, p > .05). 
 Model 7 incorporates all of our measures along with our interactions between low income 
and measure of global economic and political integration. The earlier pattern regarding the 
positive, significant difference in TSMO participation among low income countries with higher 
rates of trade compared to other countries is not apparent when rates of participation in global 
political institutions are taken into consideration. This finding further bolsters our argument that 
global political institutions matter more for fostering participation in transnational society than 
do global economic ties, and this is particularly true for low-income countries. 
 Regarding the positive and significant associations between global political integration 
and TSMO participation, a 25% increase in participation in IGOs yields a 25% surge in 
participation in transnational TSMOs for high- and middle-income countries. This improvement 
in participation grows by 29% for low income countries for the same percentage increase in IGO 
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involvement. Interestingly, the interaction term used to test the “hypocrisy thesis” approaches 
significance in this model. For low-income countries, the effect of treaty ratification is lower 
than that for middle- and high-income countries. A one unit increase in the number of treaties 
ratified in high- and middle-income countries results in an 11% rise in rates of TSMO 
participation, net all other factors. Among low-income countries, participation rates improve by 
roughly 4% with every one-unit increase in treaty ratification.  This finding supports the 
contention that international institutions matter and that their impact is mediated by a country’s 
position in the global economic hierarchy.  Low-income countries may be more hypocritical in 
relation to international human rights treaties, since they are more likely to sign treaties as a way 
of compensating for their relative weakness in the inter-state system.  They also may tend to 
have less intention of following treaty commitments than their richer counterparts (Tsutsui and 
Wotipka 2003).  While participation in treaties does increase the chances that low-income 
countries will be represented in TSMOs, the relatively lower engagement of civil society in those 
countries dampens this effect relative to its impact on countries with higher income levels. 
 Appendix 2 contains the observed and predicted values for rates of TSMO participation 
for every country in our analysis grouped by World Bank income classification. An index of 
dissimilarity is calculated to compare the expected distributions with the observed distributions. 
A score for each group appears at the bottom of the tables. The scores show that our models 
predict rates of TSMO participation better for high income countries than for others. Since there 
is far less variation in the essential predictors of participation, namely levels of democracy, IGO 
memberships and human rights treaty ratification, this is not a surprising result. Moreover, there 
is less variation across high income countries in rates of TSMO participation. For the wealthier 
group of countries, around 6% of cases would have to be redistributed to match the observed 
  
 
29 
distributions. The comparable figures for middle and low income countries are 11% and 13% 
respectively. 
        
Conclusion 
 Some scholars of globalization argue that the rise of supranational institutions and an 
increasingly integrated global economy signals the decline of the national state, but our study 
suggests that such a conclusion is premature at best.  The state still matters tremendously in 
conditioning the possibilities for individuals to engage in political associations that cross national 
boundaries.  Regardless of the availability of resources for political mobilization, countries with 
stronger democratic traditions were better represented in transnational social movement 
organizations.   
 Most notably, our findings challenge predominant assumptions that it is the economic 
forms of global integration that matter the most.  Controlling for other factors, we found no 
significant effects of important measures of economic integration – amount of foreign direct 
investment, aid flows, and trade – on participation in TSMOs.  Moreover, the models including 
only economic integration measures were the weakest among those we tested. 
 Our results provide strong support for our contention that international institutions matter, 
at least for explaining how people engage in transnational political action.  Countries with 
structured, routine participation in the global polity, measured in terms of memberships in 
international organizations and treaties, are more likely to become “socialized” into the norms of 
international society (Finnemore 1996; Riemann 2002).  These are the same countries that are 
likely to have comparatively higher levels of citizen participation in TSMOs.  Evidence from 
other studies suggests that transnational, or world cultural processes are becoming more 
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influential over time.  For instance, longitudinal studies by Ramirez and his colleagues and by 
Tsutsui and Wotipka found stronger world cultural effects on the adoption of women’s suffrage 
and on participation in international human rights NGOs, respectively, in more recent years than 
they found in earlier years (Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2003).  
Thus, if we test our models with data from earlier time periods, we would expect to find much 
weaker connections between a state’s integration into the global polity and its levels of 
transnational participation. 
 Global political institutions matter, but we also found that their impact varies according 
to a country’s position in the world-system hierarchy.  We found that low-income countries with 
higher numbers of ties to intergovernmental organizations tended to be more active in 
transnational associations.  This finding corresponds best with an institutional or world polity 
explanation rather than with the notion that economic globalization drives other forms of 
transnational interaction.  Countries that are more vulnerable to pressures from richer states may 
find opportunities for enhancing their influence in global affairs through global institutions.  
Global institutions extend legitimacy to a state, thereby providing incentives for governments to 
join them.  Paradoxically, by using international institutions to bolster their position in the inter-
state system, low-income countries create internal conditions that encourage civil society 
mobilization within their borders, and although they may join treaties with few intentions of 
following them, they may soon face rising internal pressures to conform to international 
standards.  
 Our study leads us to some suggestions for future research.  First, while our findings 
related to economic integration measures were robust across the variety of tests we ran, 
disaggregated measures of trade may shed more light onto how economic integration may be 
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related to other forms of global engagement.  The robust standard error for our trade variable 
tended to be high compared to that for other variables, suggesting a disconnect between our 
conceptualization of trade and its measurement.  And conceptually, we know that a society with 
high import trade may differ in important ways from a society with high export trade with regard 
to opportunities for transnational association, as will countries whose primary exports are in 
extractive industries rather than manufacturing.  For our purposes, however, it was worthwhile to 
maintain the degrees of freedom, given the size of our population, and we note that our analysis 
yielded robust results.  Additionally, as noted in the text, the pattern of the relationship between 
TSMO participation and debt warrants further investigation. Citizens of low-income countries 
having relatively high amounts of external debt may tend to have more involvement in 
transnational economic rights and justice movements than their counterparts in low-income 
countries with relatively low amounts of external debt.  Scholars have uncovered evidence of a 
burgeoning in cross-border alliance formation around structural adjustment policies and the 
increasing debt burden of poor countries (see, e.g., Desmarais 2002). Hence, the relationship 
between debt and TSMO participation might be brought into greater relief if the dependent 
variable, TSMO participation, were disaggregated by issue area.  
 In sum, we find that the size and comprehensiveness of global civil society is strongly 
related to increased global political integration, not economic integration.  The “trickle-down” 
theory of global integration—i.e., that economic integration will produce economic growth that, 
in turn, supports and encourages other forms of transnational cooperation—is not supported with 
the evidence we use here.  Instead, it is a country’s participation in intergovernmental 
organizations and in global treaty bodies that encourages its citizens to engage in other forms of 
transnational association, and this can overcome the disadvantages of a country’s position in the 
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world economy.  More democratic countries are the most active participants in all forms of 
transnational association, but the results here show that the direction of influence may be two-
way.  Institutional norms and pressures can lead non-democratic states to join international 
treaties and organizations.  Global political integration, in turn, encourages democratization 
within countries by legitimizing values of pluralism, equality and tolerance and by creating 
processes that can socialize states along these values (Boli and Thomas 1999; UNDP 2002).  In 
the aftermath of September 11, multilateral institutions may prove even more central to efforts of 
all countries to promote their own security interests (despite arguments to the contrary in the 
United States).  And the new demands being made on the United Nations attest to this 
development.  This should contribute to the strengthening and democratization29 of multilateral 
political institutions and -- our study shows -- to an increasingly integrated, more comprehensive, 
and vibrant global civil society.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables used in analysis 
 
Variable (Year) Range Mean Standard deviation 
TSMOs (2000) 15 – 553 174 118 
Population (1990) 1,057,000 – 1,140,000,000 35,400,000 121,000,000 
GNP per capita  (1990) $104.09 – $29,929.68 $3,819.46 $6,034.58 
Democracy (1994) 0 – 10 5 4 
Trade - %GDP (1990) 7.46% - 386.36% 63.09% 43.53% 
FDI - % GDP (1990) -8.73% - 14.89% .93% 1.85% 
ODA - % GNP (1991) -.01 –  83.79% 5.95% 10.79% 
Debt - % GDP (1990) 0 – 947% 75.84% 131.39% 
IGOs (1995) 11 - 90 45 18 
Human rights treaties (1995) 0 – 7 5 2 
Years member of the UN (1995) 0 – 50 36 16 
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Table 2:  Results from Negative Binomial Regression of TSMO Participation on Measures 
of Domestic Opportunity and Global Integration with Controls (N=144) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Control Variables        
Population (log 10) .484*** 
(.061) 
.583*** 
(.075) 
.564*** 
(.079) 
.324*** 
(.051) 
.339*** 
(.051) 
.384*** 
(.065) 
.397*** 
(.068) 
Low Income -.696*** 
(.119) 
-.966*** 
(.154) 
-.987*** 
(.157) 
-.263** 
(.102) 
-.352*** 
(.102) 
-.268* 
(.128) 
-.281* 
(.127) 
Middle Income -.504*** 
(.088) 
-.575*** 
(.105) 
-.593*** 
(.111) 
-.157* 
(.079) 
-.274*** 
(.081) 
-.152+ 
(.092) 
-.246* 
(.097) 
Democracy .052*** 
(.012) 
.054*** 
(.012) 
.051*** 
(.012) 
.061*** 
(.009) 
.058*** 
(.009) 
.061*** 
(.009) 
.057*** 
(.009) 
Economic Integration 
 
       
Trade (log 10) 
 
.251 
(.192) 
-.034 
(.188) 
 
 
.208+ 
(.121) 
.207 
(.154) 
FDI    (log 10)  
 
.039 
(.208) 
.129 
(.191) 
 
 
.134 
(.216) 
.168 
(.220) 
ODA (log 10) 
 
.391*** 
(.101) 
.406*** 
(.104) 
 
 
.089 
(.069) 
.064 
(.071) 
Debt  (log 10) 
 
-.068 
(.070) 
-.075 
(.086) 
 
 
-.070 
(.061) 
-.112 
(.072) 
Political Integration 
 
       
# IGOs (log 10) 
   
1.71*** 
(.199) 
1.13*** 
(.259) 
 
1.59*** 
(.199) 
.961*** 
(.287) 
# HR Treaties ratified 1995 or 
earlier    
.075*** 
(.022) 
.095*** 
(.028) 
.078*** 
(.022) 
 
.106*** 
(.029) 
Years member of the UN as of 
1995 
   
-.002 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.003) 
Interaction Terms 
 
   
 
  
 
Low income*trade 
  
.780** 
(.307) 
 
  
.124 
(.216) 
Low-income*debt 
  
.045 
(.164) 
 
  
-.053 
(.142) 
Low income*IGO 
   
 1.01*** 
(.289) 
 
1.11*** 
(.300) 
Low-income*HR treaties 
   
 -.045 
(.039) 
 
-.075+ 
(.042) 
Overdispersion Parameter (α ) .178*** 
(.023) 
.161*** 
(.018) 
.154*** 
(.018) 
.097*** 
(.014) 
.089*** 
(.014) 
.094*** 
(.013) 
.085*** 
(.145) 
Log – likelihood -799.25 -791.64 -788.79 -751.54 -746.21 -749.52 -742.81 
See text for definition of variables and data sources. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*p<=.05, **p<=.01, ***p<=.001, +.10 > p > .05  (one tailed tests).  
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Appendix 1:  Definitions of global economic measures used in analysis 
 
 
All of the following variables except ODA are measured as a share of GDP. ODA is measured as 
a share of GNP.   
 
Trade: Sum ($US) of exports and imports of goods and services. 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI):  Net inflows of investment acquiring a lasting management 
interest (10% or more of voting stock according to World Bank measures) in a country’s 
domestic enterprises.   
 
Official development assistance (ODA): Net inflows and outflows of foreign assistance.  For 
recipient countries, ODA is the net receipt of development loans and grants made on 
concessional terms by official agencies of donor governments. For donor countries, ODA is the 
total amount of loans and grants to recipient countries.  
 
Total external debt: Debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or 
services and is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term 
debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. 
Appendix 2: Zero-order Correlations for Variables in Analysis 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) TSMOs 1.00           
(2) Population .437 1.00          
(3) GNP per capita .677 -.017 1.00         
(4) Democracy .546 .003 .421 1.00        
(5) Trade %GDP -.085 -.509 .076 .059 1.00       
(6) FDI % GDP .146 -.069 .157 .200 .247 1.00      
(7) ODA % GNP -.372 -.088 -.517 -.277 -.079 -.189 1.00     
(8) Debt % GDP -.452 -.119 -.569 -.255 .046 -.109 .325 1.00    
(9) IGOs .696 .129 .522 .144 -.051 .066 -.121 -.032 1.00   
(10) HR treaties .363 .041 .097 .306 -.052 -.032 -.069 -.148 .236 1.00  
(11) Years UN member .360 .313 .062 .172 -.168 .081 .070 .003 .516 .215 1.00 
 
Appendix 3: Observed and Predicted Values for TSMO participation with dissimilarity measures 
Low Income Countries Observed Predicted Residual 
Kenya    246 118 -128 
Zimbabwe 196 103 -93 
Ghana    196 118 -78 
Indonesia 191 118 -73 
Sierra Leone  134 75 -59 
Senegal  206 157 -49 
Uganda   171 127 -44 
Nigeria  214 173 -41 
Burkina  139 99 -40 
Tanzania 177 137 -40 
Cameroon 164 134 -30 
Nicaragua 154 127 -27 
Togo     134 109 -25 
Liberia  99 78 -21 
Angola   84 69 -15 
Nepal    158 143 -15 
Zambia   154 140 -14 
Bangladesh 195 188 -7 
Cote d’Ivoire  152 146 -6 
Eritrea  35 30 -5 
Burundi  89 85  -4 
Georgia  69 65 -4 
Azerbaijan 50 47 -3 
Congo 103 100 -3 
Laos PDR 42 41 -1 
Guinea   99 102 3 
Myanmar  40 43 3 
Rwanda   94 97 3 
Tajikistan 29 33 4 
Mauritania 88 94 6 
Mozambique   106 115 9 
Pakistan 202 211 9 
Uzbekistan 52 64 12 
Haiti    99 112 13 
Ethiopia 118 133 15 
Kyrgyzstan   36 51 15 
Moldova  55 70 15 
Cambodia 63 79 16 
Sudan    110 126 16 
Mongolia 68 85 17 
Lesotho  94 113 19 
North Korea  30 60 30 
Benin    137 169 32 
India    330 363 33 
Congo DR 148 183 35 
Chad     72 109 37 
Papua New Guinea 81 118 37 
Malawi   99 138 39 
Madagascar 98 146 48 
Vietnam  98 147 49 
Central African Republic 76 126 50 
Niger    99 150 51 
Afghanistan 30 82 52 
Mali     135 195 60 
Somalia  49 109 60 
Yemen    44 115 71 
Index of dissimilarity   13% 
Note: For all dissimilarity tables, data are sorted on the value of the residual in ascending order. Residuals with a negative 
number indicate the amount by which the equation under predicted the number of TSMO memberships. The figures for predicted 
and residual counts are rounded to the nearest tenth. 
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Middle income countries Observed Predicted Residual 
South Africa 269 139 -130 
Mexico   260 182 -78 
Peru     227 150 -77 
Mauritius 144 73 -71 
Croatia  164 94 -70 
Philippines 252 187 -65 
Czech Republic 263 210 -53 
Thailand 197 151 -46 
Estonia  141 106 -35 
Poland   295 261 -34 
Argentina 275 242 -33 
Lithuania 149 117 -32 
Egypt    198 168 -30 
Hungary  283 253 -30 
Bolivia  176 152 -24 
Honduras 120 100 -20 
Slovakia 183 163 -20 
Lebanon  116 99 -17 
Malaysia 178 163 -15 
Morocco  174 159 -15 
Chile    245 232 -13 
Cuba     107 95 -12 
Tunisia  156 145 -11 
Dominican Republic 134 128 -6 
Latvia   129 123 -6 
Paraguay 127 124 -3 
Sri Lanka 203 200 -3 
Costa Rica 191 189 -2 
Kazakhstan 57 56 -1 
Romania  231 230 -1 
Bulgaria 214 214 0 
Botswana 91 92 1 
Macedonia 85 88 3 
Uruguay  184 191 7 
Algeria  130 139 9 
Guatemala 156 165 9 
El Salvador 142 156 14 
Saudi Arabia 61 76 15 
Iran     69 86 17 
Albania 105 124 19 
Oman     25 44 19 
Jordan   113 133 20 
Turkmenistan 15 36 21 
Trinidad 97 119 22 
Panama   136 166 30 
Syria    67 103 36 
Belarus  97 139 42 
Iraq     55 99 44 
Namibia  98 142 44 
Jamaica  113 159 46 
Ecuador  174 222 48 
Ukraine  159 211 52 
Venezuela 193 247 54 
China  148 203 55 
Armenia  52 109 57 
Libya    60 120 60 
Colombia 222 284 62 
Turkey   161 241 80 
Brazil   311 392 81 
Russia   270 356 86 
Index of dissimilarity   11% 
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High income countries Observed Predicted Residual 
France   553 400 -153 
Switzerland 420 311 -109 
Belgium  495 422 -73 
Austria  376 314 -62 
Spain    438 395 -43 
Ireland  297 258 -39 
Canada   390 363 -27 
United States 446 422 -24 
Slovenia 137 127 -10 
Greece   311 302 -9 
Italy    461 454 -7 
Kuwait   64 57 -7 
Singapore 124 118 -6 
Germany  535 533 -2 
Israel   225 224 -1 
Australia 325 332 7 
Denmark  376 387 11 
New Zealand 231 247 16 
Sweden   410 426 16 
United Arab Emirates 35 52 17 
United Kingdom      525 553 28 
Finland  334 380 46 
Norway   317 396 79 
Japan    309 397 88 
Portugal 296 391 95 
South Korea 182 284 102 
Netherlands 482 592 110 
Index of dissimilarity   6% 
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End Notes 
                                                         
1For more on the political dynamics of social movements within nested national and inter-state politics see  Rothman 
and Oliver (2002), Tarrow (2001a; 2003), and Smith, Pagucco and Chatfield (1997).
 
2 Many social scientists discuss the importance of networks in contemporary global settings.  Certainly the 
proliferation of relatively low-cost communications and travel –related technologies have enabled more informal 
and decentralized relations to span an ever-widening geographic scope.  While we clearly see networks embedded 
within the organizations we study, we focus here on more formally structured relationships (i.e., organizations), 
because these are likely to be more durable and predictable than “networks,” and they also allow for large scale and 
longitudinal comparisons that would be very difficult to do with networks.  That said, it is clear that the 
organizations we analyze operate in ways that are similar to networks, that they build upon the technologies and 
opportunities that also facilitate networks, and that in many ways they are becoming more decentralized and 
informal like networks. 
3 INGOs is the common term used among practitioners and in much of the political science literature and within the 
United Nations System to refer to voluntary, nonprofit citizens associations.  It includes groups as diverse as the 
International Olympic Committee, Amnesty International, and the International Elvis Presley Fan Club. 
4 While other non-governmental organizations are important in social movements, existing research suggests that it 
is those groups that are specifically focused on movement goals that play consistent roles in either mobilizing or 
introducing innovations into social movements.  Thus, we focus on those groups that we expect to be most involved 
in social movement activity (Smith et al. 1997). 
5 Following common practices among scholars and practitioners of global politics, we use the terms “global North” 
to refer to the Western, post-industrial states (members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, OECD), and “global South” to refer to those post-colonial and later-industrializing states that 
generally comprise what world-systems scholars call the “periphery” and  “semi-periphery.” 
6 The standard deviation for non-core countries is 74% of mean, compared to 23% for core countries. 
7 However, the work of Tilly (1990), Walton and Seddon (1994), and of World Systems theorists argues for a 
treatment of the state that accounts for its position in the global economic and political order. 
8 Our preliminary examination of this hypothesis suggests, however, that transnational human rights groups are not 
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any more likely to be active in repressive contexts, at least not in the sense that they have participants from those 
regions among their members.  In fact, environmental groups – perhaps because their grievances can in some 
instances be cast in more politically neutral terms—seem somewhat better able to cultivate transnational ties in more 
repressive settings. 
9 We currently lack comparative data on the strength of national voluntary sectors, but existing measures of political 
openness and democratic practice indicate the extent to which citizens of a country enjoy the right to free 
association. 
10 This is not meant to imply that the domestic politics of core states are not affected by global factors (see, 
e.g., Evangelista 1995; Knopf 1993), but rather that periphery states are more vulnerable to external influences on a 
wider range of policy areas. 
11 Several respondents to a survey Smith conducted of affiliates of a transnational organization, EarthAction, 
captured this sentiment as they described a sense of being doubly disenfranchised: they had little effective access to 
their domestic political leaders, and their governments had little impact on the United Nations, which they saw as 
being dominated by the United States (Smith 2002).  
12 It bears noting that as protesters gathered in Washington D.C. in April 2000 to protest the World Bank and IMF, 
the countries of the Group of 77 passed a resolution in support of popular critiques of the global financial system. 
13 Many international treaties and declarations call explicitly for states to include nongovernmental organizations in 
various aspects of policy making and monitoring of international agreements. 
14 A similar dynamic is outlined in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink’s (1999) “spiral model” for explaining changes in 
human rights practices, and in Friedman, Clark, and Hochstetler (Forthcoming). 
15 Coders worked as a team to identify cases for inclusion in the study.  We excluded religious bodies or groups 
promoting some religious or spiritual order, foundations, and research institutes from the database.  Most groups 
could easily be classified as social-change oriented or not.   The cases that were not readily discerned were reviewed 
by two other research team members, including the principal investigator (Smith).  Groups that tended to cause 
difficulties were ones working for development, which often engage primarily in service as opposed to advocacy/ 
empowerment work.  For more details on case selection and coding, contact Jackie Smith. 
16 The predominance of progressive organizations in our dataset is due in part to the systematic under-reporting of 
right-wing and extremist groups.  The illicit nature of some of these groups’ activities, and the exclusionary nature 
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of their organizing work make them less likely to either respond to Yearbook requests for information or be tied to 
international networks that increase the chance that their presence will be known to other international groups.  
Nevertheless, Yearbook editions include records of such groups, and the Internet allows them to identify more of 
them.  Thus, these groups are included in the dataset, but their numbers are quite small. 
17 We also constructed a domestic resources scale, which included the sum of the deviation scores for GNP per 
capita, % enrollment in tertiary education and % urban population. We ran the models with this scale (omitting the 
dummy variables for GNP per capita) and achieved results similar to those reported below. We decided to not use 
one or both of the other variables included in the scale in our final models because of multicolinearity.  GNP per 
capita is highly correlated with the other two variables, and we concluded that although there may be slight 
conceptual differences between the variables, they essentially measure the same phenomenon. 
18 The dates of membership were recorded from the New York Times Almanac. 
19 The treaties included in this count are considered the major instruments of human rights law.  They include the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention Against Torture, Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of Genocide. 
20 For all of our measures, we substituted missing values using the mean for the countries within the same World 
Bank economic grouping for 1990 (see, e.g., Allison 2001). 
21 We then used a natural log transformation and tested our models. We excluded extreme observations and found 
that unlike in our models containing the base 10-transformed variables, outliers influenced our results.  
22 Indirect pressure is the result of what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call a “boomerang effect,” when groups within a 
repressive political context forge alliances with transnational actors that can bring pressure on that state through 
international institutions. 
23 The original bivariate relationship between trade and TSMO participation is negative, though close to 0. In model 
2, when we control for domestic factors, trade takes on a positive, but nonsignificant, relationship with TSMO 
participation. Since there is a strong, negative relationship between population and trade, as well as a strong, positive 
relationship between population and TSMO participation, we interpret the change in sign as the result of a 
suppressor effect. In this case, population suppresses the relationship between trade and TSMO participation, 
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particularly for low-income countries, which tend to have lower participation in TSMOs as well as lower trade than 
other countries. 
 
24 To determine if the smaller standard deviation scores for donor countries (i.e. countries at the lower end of our 
ODA flows scale) were biasing our results, we ran the models for recipient countries only and compared these to the 
models that include all countries. First, we note that the bivarate relationship between TSMO participation and ODA 
received is not as strong for recipient countries only as it is when all countries are included in the analysis (-.104 for 
recipient countries and  -.372 for all countries). However, when ODA is included in regression models comparing 
rates of TSMO participation among recipient countries only, we find the same relationship between ODA flows and 
TSMO participation as we report in table 2, where both donors and recipients are included. 
25 During the 1990s, increasing amounts of bilateral aid was channeled through non-governmental organizations or 
NGOs. 
26 The coefficients were transformed into incident rate ratios or IRR (λi = exp(α + βixi + … + βkxk). For logged 
variables, the percent increase was derived by multiplying  the IRR by log10([100+x]/100), where x is equal to the 
percent change in the predictor variable (25 in this case). 
27 We note that the sign for the contingent effect of trade does change from positive to negative in regression model 
3, where the economic interaction terms are included. Although we protected against multicollinearity by mean-
centering the interaction term before entering it into the model, a small degree of multicollinearity is likely to be 
present. We tested the tolerance of the coefficients to investigate whether inclusion of the interaction terms yields 
unstable estimates. In the model without the interaction term for low income and trade, tolerance is .210 and the 
value inflation factor is 4.8 for low income, representing the lowest tolerance in the model and, therefore, the highest 
variance inflation. When the interaction terms for low income/trade and low-income/debt are added (political 
integration variables are not included here), the tolerance for the low-income coefficient does not change. In the full 
model, however, the tolerance decreases to .171 and the variance inflation factor reaches 5.8. Although we would be 
happier with a lower variance inflation factor, 5.8 is well below the threshold of 10, a value indicating that 
multicollinearity is dangerously influencing the estimates (Neter et. al.). Another potential cause of sign reversal in 
regression models is the violation of the assumption that the error terms are independent. We tested this assumption 
by generating a sequence plot of the residuals (Neter et. al. 1996). We ordered the countries by geographic region 
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and plotted these against the residuals. The resultant scatter plot showed random variation, thus indicating that there 
is no correlation between the error terms of geographically proximate countries.   
28 Note that the relationship between the years of UN membership shows no effect in this model (despite a strong 
and positive bivariate relationship), due to the high correlation between this variable and a country’s overall level of 
engagement in IGOs.  We ran other models containing more limited measures of IGO participation—specifically 
membership in political as opposed to purely functional IGOs—and the years of experience in the UN remained 
positive and significant. 
29 Markoff (1999; 2003) shows that most global political institutions, and especially global financial institutions, 
currently disenfranchise the world’s citizens, both nationally and internationally.  While the United Nations is more 
inclusive, the absence of formal protections for citizens’ group participation there means that these groups must 
constantly work to defend their access.  But if transnational civic engagement parallels or exceeds the growth of 
inter-governmental organizations and institutional arrangements, this will help expand what is already considerable 
pressure on the world’s governments to enhance the democratic character of the global polity, if only to ensure their 
own continued legitimacy. 
 
